== Background ==
== Background ==
{{Multiple image
| width = 150px
| image1 = Boris Tadic 2010.jpg
| image2 = Ivica Dačić 2011.jpg
| footer = The [[Democratic Party (Serbia)|Democratic Party]], led by [[Boris Tadić]] (left), formed a [[coalition government]] with the [[Socialist Party of Serbia]], led by [[Ivica Dačić]] (right), after the 2008 elections
}}
After the [[2008 Serbian presidential election]], the government of [[Vojislav Koštunica]] of the [[Democratic Party of Serbia]] (DSS) fell and [[2008 Serbian parliamentary election|parliamentary elections]] were called for 11 May 2008. The coalition around the [[Socialist Party of Serbia]] (SPS) decided to abandon talks with the DSS and the [[Serbian Radical Party]] (SRS) regarding the formation of the government and instead chose to join the government led by the [[Democratic Party (Serbia)|Democratic Party]] (DS), a move that was lobbied by the DS and foreign powers. The SPS and DS were previously political rivals. After the formation of the [[Cabinet of Mirko Cvetković|coalition government]], [[Ivica Dačić]] and [[Boris Tadić]], the leaders of the SPS and DS, respectively, signed the Declaration of Political Reconciliation, arguing that their reconciliation was politically and programmatically rational and that their government had the support of the European Union and the United States. In the declaration, the SPS and DS argued for continuing the [[accession of Serbia to the European Union]] while opposing the [[independence of Kosovo]], as well as fighting against crime and corruption. Regarding the economy, the DS-led government argued that it would dynamically increase its economic activities, with an increase of the [[gross domestic product]] (GDP) by 7% every year, increase the employment rate by creating at least 200,000 new jobs by 2012 and by lowering the unemployment rate to 11.9%, and continue regional development.{{Sfn|Vuković|2012|pp=11–12}}
After the [[2008 Serbian presidential election]], the government of [[Vojislav Koštunica]] of the [[Democratic Party of Serbia]] (DSS) fell and [[2008 Serbian parliamentary election|parliamentary elections]] were called for 11 May 2008. The coalition around the [[Socialist Party of Serbia]] (SPS) decided to abandon talks with the DSS and the [[Serbian Radical Party]] (SRS) regarding the formation of the government and instead chose to join the government led by the [[Democratic Party (Serbia)|Democratic Party]] (DS), a move that was lobbied by the DS and foreign powers. The SPS and DS were previously political rivals. After the formation of the [[Cabinet of Mirko Cvetković|coalition government]], [[Ivica Dačić]] and [[Boris Tadić]], the leaders of the SPS and DS, respectively, signed the Declaration of Political Reconciliation, arguing that their reconciliation was politically and programmatically rational and that their government had the support of the European Union and the United States. In the declaration, the SPS and DS argued for continuing the [[accession of Serbia to the European Union]] while opposing the [[independence of Kosovo]], as well as fighting against crime and corruption. Regarding the economy, the DS-led government argued that it would dynamically increase its economic activities, with an increase of the [[gross domestic product]] (GDP) by 7% every year, increase the employment rate by creating at least 200,000 new jobs by 2012 and by lowering the unemployment rate to 11.9%, and continue regional development.{{Sfn|Vuković|2012|pp=11–12}}
General elections.
After the 2008 Serbian presidential election, the government of Vojislav Koštunica of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) fell and parliamentary elections were called for 11 May 2008. The coalition around the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) decided to abandon talks with the DSS and the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) regarding the formation of the government and instead chose to join the government led by the Democratic Party (DS), a move that was lobbied by the DS and foreign powers. The SPS and DS were previously political rivals. After the formation of the coalition government, Ivica Dačić and Boris Tadić, the leaders of the SPS and DS, respectively, signed the Declaration of Political Reconciliation, arguing that their reconciliation was politically and programmatically rational and that their government had the support of the European Union and the United States. In the declaration, the SPS and DS argued for continuing the accession of Serbia to the European Union while opposing the independence of Kosovo, as well as fighting against crime and corruption. Regarding the economy, the DS-led government argued that it would dynamically increase its economic activities, with an increase of the gross domestic product (GDP) by 7% every year, increase the employment rate by creating at least 200,000 new jobs by 2012 and by lowering the unemployment rate to 11.9%, and continue regional development.
The government was met with the Great Recession soon after, which delayed the Annex to the General Collective Agreement, which stipulated the obligation of employers to pay compensation for a hot meal in the amount of 15% and holiday allowance in the amount of 75% of the average salary. Additionally, the government started implementing the Stabilisation and Association Process, but due to unsuccessful privatisations and Yugoslav Wars, the government was not ready to fully liberalise the economy. The government also promised to give out €1,000 to every adult citizen, but this never happened. Serbia was met with a low increase of the GDP and an increase in unemployment and consumption during the entire term of the government. The government did not create 200,000 new jobs, the unemployment rate instead rose to 23.7%, wages and pensions were increased slightly, and debt increased to €14 billion by November 2011. On foreign issues, the government was met with the independence of Kosovo and the talks to Serbia join the EU. The government arrested and extradited politicians Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić in 2008 and 2011, respectively. Serbia officially got candidate status for European Union membership shortly before the end of the government’s term, in March 2012. Tadić also initiated the Four Pillars foreign policy, arguing that Serbia should have equal relations with the EU, U.S., Russia, and China; the policy was met with criticism. Regional cooperation, particularly with Croatia, were improved. Under Tadić’s term, the position of the president of Serbia was somewhat presidential. As the leader of the government party, the executive government was controlled by Tadić, despite Mirko Cvetković officially being the prime minister. Tadić was often involved in government discussions and decisions.
Major changes also occured in the SRS. Maja Gojković, its vice president, left the party in March 2008 and formed the People’s Party, while in September 2008, Tomislav Nikolić, the deputy president, was kicked out of the party and formed the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). In the National Assembly of Serbia, Nikolić was joined by 21 former members of the SRS. Nikolić split from the SRS due to disagreements on the accession of Serbia to the EU; SRS had officially opposed it. After the formation of the SNS, the popularity of SRS decreased dramastically and most of its officials defected to the SNS. The SNS sought to present itself as a centrist party which did not support SRS’s ultranationalism. In order to legitimise its position, the SNS began calling out for snap parliamentary elections.
There were no major changes to Serbia’s electoral system. The process of the registration of a political party was slightly changed; instead of 100 signatories, political parties needed to have 10,000 signatories in order to officially register as a political party. Some parties challenged this change. By the 2012 elections, there were 89 political parties, half of whom represented ethnic minorities. The Law on the Unified Voter List was also introduced, which for the first time created a list of all eligible voters. Those in favour of the law argued that it would increase accuracy in voting. Changes were also made to election financing and media.
This was the third snap presidential election since the introduction of the multi-party system in 1990. Originally, they were scheduled to be held in 2013, but Tadić called the elections earlier in hope that the general elections would benefit the DS. Tadić did not consult with his coalition partners before calling a snap election. This decision was met with criticism from other political parties.
Presidential candidates
[edit]
The RIK published a list of 12 presidential candidates on 20 April 2012. The political scientist Milan Jovanović argued that political parties were forced to register their presidential candidates in order to receive more financial support from the government, increase their media coverage, and homogenise their voter demographics. Out of all electoral lists, only six did not register their presidential candidates.
Considering that local, provincial, parliamentary, and presidential elections were held on the same day, the campaign for all elections were effectively merged. The campaign effectively began in April 2010, with the petition of the SNS–New Serbia coalition for snap elections and with their mass protests. The campaign was continued with the local elections, the process of obtaining EU candidate membership, mutual criticism of government partners, as well as the government reconstruction in March 2011, which removed Mlađan Dinkić from the government. Nikolić began a hunger strike in April 2011 in response to the government declining to call snap parliamentary elections. Before the presidential elections were called, parties campaigned on their political programmes. However, once the presidential elections were called, they switched them with showcasing their presidential candidates.
Most political parties campaigned on solving the economic crisis, whether by increasing foreign investments, concentrating on middle and small-sized enterprises, creating new jobs, subsiding agriculture, financing infrastructure projects, reforming the tax system, decentralisation, departisation, and promoting small government. Additionally, most political parties favoured the accession of Serbia to the European Union, solving the Kosovo crisis, and supporting Republika Srpska and Serbs in former Yugoslav countries. Jovanović argued that there were little differences in campaigns of all political parties and that in the first round of the presidential elections, the campaign was mostly met with positive tones.
Tadić insisted on a constructive campaign, arguing that the DS-led government effectively stabilished prices and the financial system, increased foreign investments, promoted peace and stability, fought against corruption, and made the EU candidate status possible. He also argued that the DS would “end what it began” (se završilo započeto). The DS was, however, criticised due to its record from the coalition government. The late stage of the campaign became increasingly negative; Jelena Trivan argued that the DS wanted peace while the opposition wanted war. DS also highlighted Nikolić’s past as an ultranationalist-turned-pro-EU politician. The second round was marked with Tadić’s nervous and immoderate behaviour.
Serbian Progressive Party
[edit]
The early campaign of the SNS was marked with protests, performances in the National Assembly, and Nikolić’s hunger strike. SNS sought to present itself as a political party that wanted to form a government and not stay in the political opposition. It ran an effectively anti-establishment campaign; it promised to bring investments of €100 billion by 2022, reform public procurements to fight corruption, increase infrastructure investments, and fight poverty, while strongly criticising the DS-led government. The SNS argued that they were the only ones able to defeat the DS.
Socialist Party of Serbia
[edit]
Dačić and the SPS–United Serbia–Party of United Pensioners of Serbia coalition ran on a positive campaign. They highlighted the police’s fight against crime, the ministry led by Dačić, and positioned itself as an “authentic leftist” (autentična levica) party which would dismantle the neoliberal model, cancel privatisations, jail foreign investors who refuse to allow labour organising, increase wages, and invest in free education and healthcare. Political analysts argued that Dačić’s campaign was authoritarian and emotionally-driven.
Serbian Radical Party
[edit]
The SRS initially nominated Aleksandar Martinović as their presidential candidate, however, they switched him with Vojislav Šešelj‘s wife Jadranka. The SRS campaigned on criticising the SNS.
United Regions of Serbia
[edit]
The United Regions of Serbia, a political coalition led by Dinkić’s G17 Plus, campaigned on positive themes, mainly on decentralisation and regionalism. They nominated Zoran Stanković as their presidential candidate.
Democratic Party of Serbia
[edit]
Koštunica was the presidential candidate of the DSS. His party campaigned on ending the accession of Serbia to the European Union, establishing deeper connections with Russia, promoting military neutrality, and opposing Kosovo’s independence.
Liberal Democratic Party
[edit]
The Liberal Democratic Party of Čedomir Jovanović campaigned on supporting the independence of Kosovo, maintaining the market economy, as well as supporting the accession of Serbia to the European Union.
Opinion polls predicted that there would be a significant decrease in voter turnout; this ended up being incorrect, once the results were rolled out. There was only a 4% decrease in the voter turnout.
After the first round of the presidential election, the SNS and Nikolić alleged electoral fraud, arguing that the voters list included over 500,000 dead voters. At one media conference, they showed a bag of allegedly over 3,000 ballots. The DS denied the accusations.
In the second round of the presidential election, former members of the DS, Civic Alliance of Serbia, and Democratic Opposition of Serbia launched a campaign of “white ballots” (beli listići), arguing that voters of Tadić and Jovanović should be absent from the elections. The campaign was ignored in the traditional media; instead, it garnered following online. The campaign ended up being successful; in comparison with the 2008 elections, there were 100,000 more invalid ballots.
Parliamentary election
[edit]
Presidential election
[edit]
In the first round of the presidential election, Tadić won the most votes while Nikolić placed second. Dačić obtained an unexpected good result, winning 14% of the popular vote. Tadić won the most votes in the Prizren District, North Bačka District, Bor District, South Banat District and Belgrade, while Nikolić won the most votes in Podunavlje District, Šumadija District, Moravica District, and Jablanica District. This was the first time Tadić won against Nikolić in a presidential election; in the 2004 and 2008 elections, Nikolić always placed first. Jovanović described this as a pyrrhic victory, as Tadić went to lose to Nikolić in the second round. In comparison with the first round of the 2008 presidential election, Tadić lost around 470,000 votes while Nikolić lost around 670,000 votes. Six presidential candidates won more votes than their respective electoral lists.
In the second round of the presidential election, Nikolić prevailed over Tadić, winning just 71,000 more votes. Jovanović argued that the turnout was lower in comparison with the 2008 elections for several reasons, including voter fatigue, listed presidential candidates, role of the media, and inadequate election campaign. Tadić ended up winning in the Bor District, Raška District, Pomoravlje District, Kosovska Mitrovica District, and all districts of Vojvodina except the Srem District. Nikolić won in all other 18 districts, including Belgrade.
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