THE announcement of plans to undertake a major restructuring of Pakistan’s judicial, financial and administrative system has raised concerns across the political spectrum.
Although the ruling coalition had been in talks over the proposed amendment for some time now, Monday’s X post by Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari came as a bolt out of the blue for many.
The list of areas which would be dealt with by the proposed amendment – such as the establishment of a federal constitutional court, revival of executive magistracy, transfer of high court judges, removal of protection for the share of provinces in the divisible pool, changes to Article 243 which covers the appointment of services chiefs, the return of the education and population planning to the centre, and breaking the deadlock over the appointment of the chief election commissioner – has the potential to upend the political and administrative structure of the country.
Some social media handles with Sindhi origins are already abuzz with all kinds of theories about the proposed amendment. These include speculation about a quid-pro-quo involving the formation of a PPP government in Azad Kashmir in exchange for the party’s support. The ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PMLN) has, indeed, dangled more carrots in front of the PPP than just the Azad Kashmir government. Most notably, these include the setting up of a federal constitutional court – a longstanding PPP demand that was withdrawn during the 26th amendment negotiations only after the government agreed to set up a constitutional bench within the Supreme Court.
While Mr Bhutto-Zardari stated in his tweet that his party’s central executive committee (CEC) will meet on Thursday to discuss the proposed amendment and whether or not to support its passage, some early signs suggest the decision will not be easy. His party risks losing legitimacy and public support, especially in its Sindh stronghold. Posts on Sindh-based social media handles suggest that Sindhi nationalists, civil society activists and intellectuals will strongly oppose the likely reversal of the protection for the provinces’ share in the NFC. They are also likely to oppose the return of two important departments to the federal government.
PPP’s dilemma
“This is a complete rollback of the 18th Amendment,” notes a PPP leader from Sindh on the condition of anonymity because he didn’t want to say anything publicly before the CEC meeting. “It will be very, very difficult for the party to accept this as it goes against everything we have stood and fought for. Once the constitutional safeguard ensuring the provinces’ share from the NFC is revoked, we’ll be back to square one.
“This safeguard was introduced precisely to prevent any future dictator or even a democratic government from arbitrarily cutting the provincial share. Look at the contradiction — on the one hand, they admit federal expenditures are rising. On the other, they want to snatch away two more ministries, for education and population planning,” he muses. He adds that of the 17 ministries that were devolved, several have already found their way back to the federal government in one form or another. “For instance, agriculture was devolved, but the centre later created the Ministry of Food Security to retain control over agriculture.”
He did not, however, elaborate on the potential reaction within the party over the proposed constitutional court, revival of the executive magistracy and change in the procedure for appointing the chief election commissioner.
Most political analysts, however, don’t see the PPP rejecting the proposed amendments in toto. Senior analyst and columnist Suhail Warraich, who is considered close to top PPP leadership, especially President Asif Zardari, doesn’t see the PPP compromising on the NFC or the 18th Amendment. “Provincial autonomy has always been central to their politics. That’s why it was part of the MRD’s [Movement for Restoration of Democracy] agenda and later an important element of the Charter of Democracy.”
Nonetheless, he says, the party is likely to agree on the formation of a federal constitutional court, which is also a component of the Charter of Democracy, and even on whatever changes are being proposed to Article 243. “The NFC and 18th Amendment will be their red line though,” he adds.
Another political commentator and journalist, Badar Alam, believes that the PPP would be committing suicide if it agrees to roll back provincial autonomy guaranteed in the 18th Amendment. “The party will lose its political relevance if it surrenders on the NFC Award and agrees to transfer education and population — two key pillars of provincial autonomy — back to the centre,” he says. “The people of Sindh were unhappy even when the federal government pushed canal-building projects and the party leadership initially chose to ignore their concerns. If a similar approach is taken on the NFC, it will only strengthen nationalist forces in Sindh.”
Like Mr Warraich, he also believes that it will be easier for the PPP to agree on the creation of a constitutional court and even on amendments to Article 243 of the Constitution. “However, details about both remain sketchy for now, making it difficult to comment definitively. The idea of a federal constitutional court is, in principle, a sound one. But if implemented at this stage, it will likely be viewed as an attempt to curb the judiciary’s powers. Besides, since we already have a constitutional bench in the Supreme Court, the likelihood of frequent jurisdictional disputes between the two bodies would be quite high.”
Economic implications
Changes in the NFC have long been part of the IMF and World Bank’s agenda. The framework has effectively been undermined earlier by forcing provinces to produce budget surpluses at the cost of development and public welfare. The federal government has also resorted to indirect taxation on petroleum, gas and other items to bypass the current NFC arrangement. Economist Waqar Wadho, who teaches at the Lahore School of Economics, says that since the announcement of the 7th NFC Award, the federal government has been trying to increase its revenues. “Because it cannot do so through the divisible pool owing to the constitutional safeguard for the provinces, it has resorted to indirect taxation like the imposition of various levies, including the one on petroleum products.”
“However, the numbers show that even these additional revenues are insufficient for the centre to meet its growing expenditures. A major portion of federal income is consumed by defence-related spending and interest payments,” he notes. “Now, the goal appears to be to boost revenues through the divisible pool itself by legally increasing the federal share. But that will not mean the centre will roll back the levies it has already imposed to enhance its revenue outside the NFC. Those are likely to remain in place even after the federal share is raised.”
Mr Wadho argues that the change in the NFC sharing formula in favour of the centre will have serious implications for provinces, especially the smaller ones. “A reduced provincial share will directly impact their capacity to deliver public services. You may recall that Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have invested heavily in healthcare: KP launched its health insurance programme while Sindh focused on hospitals and related infrastructure at the district level. If their share from the NFC is cut, such initiatives will inevitably suffer.”
According to him, KP — particularly after the merger of the former FATA districts — and Balochistan will be far worse off than they are now. Sindh and Punjab, on the other hand, still have some space to generate additional tax revenues. “Yet they will also feel the strain. Once its share declines, even Punjab may no longer be able to extend support to its people the way it did after recent floods. Overall, public service delivery across the country will be hit, though Punjab and Sindh might still manage somewhat better due to their larger revenue base.”
Speaking on the implications for the PPP’s politics in Sindh, the LSE economist argues the PPP is in a really tough position. “It wants to project Bilawal Bhutto as a prime ministerial candidate and revive the party in Punjab. For both goals, it needs the goodwill of federal institutions, especially the army. That makes it difficult for the party to take a firm stand against the proposed changes because the message from the establishment seems to be that they have a choice between Maryam Nawaz Sharif and Bilawal — and that Maryam is offering them a better deal.”
The PPP can see that clearly, he says. “Yet, at the same time, Bilawal’s party depends on retaining Sindh as its power base for any chance at forming a government in Islamabad. Supporting the proposed amendment would have serious repercussions for the PPP there. We’ve already seen civil society groups, lawyers, and political parties uniting (to protect the province’s water rights) during protests against Punjab’s canal projects. So, much like the controversy over the canal projects, the party will again struggle to justify backing the 27th Amendment.”
Mr Wadho insists that Mr Bhutto-Zardari is young and has the chance to resist it if he can think beyond the next government or even the one after that. “But with Mr Zardari still calling some of the shots, the party may instead look for cosmetic adjustments to soften the blow. One possible outcome could be that they negotiate some limited protection for Sindh’s interests to make the compromise appear more acceptable.”
Legal issues
Outside Sindh too, the proposed amendment is likely to ignite opposition from other sections of society, particularly lawyers, who will not take the changes in the higher judiciary lying down. The government seems to be fully aware of that, and this shows in its timing of the proposed amendment – coming as it does right after government-backed lawyers appear to be leading in bar council elections. If the proposed amendment triggers protests and resistance from lawyers, the government believes that its allies in the bar council will help alleviate the strength of this resistance.
Constitutional expert and Supreme Court lawyer Salahuddin Ahmed argues that the proposed changes to the constitution through the 27th Amendment are mostly meant to “control the streets” through revival of executive magistracy, sideline the opposition in the process of selecting the chief election commissioner, and manage maverick judges through transfers from one court to another. “In short, it’ll be a slide into fascism brought in by parliament itself,” he concludes.
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Published in Dawn, November 4th, 2025
