The General Elections are set to take place in Bangladesh tomorrow (February 12), and the social media platform Facebook has become a battleground for disinformation in the country, with fabricated quotes, doctored images and misleading photocards circulating widely.
False statements attributed to political leaders are seeking to provoke outrage, while unrelated images are being used to create the illusion of foreign backing or geopolitical tension.
At the same time, AI‑generated visuals are being deployed to frame political figures in staged scenarios, including fabricated meetings and conspiracy theories.
Experts have warned that these tactics may fuel partisan hostility and shape public opinion ahead of the February election, as many voters are exposed to fake news.
Dr Din M Sumon Rahman, Head of Media Studies and Journalism at the University of Liberal Arts Bangladesh (ULAB), said, “The main intention behind a disinformation campaign is to manipulate voting choice. Disinformation neatly feeds the confirmation bias of a decided voter’s choice.”
The key target of disinformation are swing voters, he said.
“Voters who don’t know whom to vote for, don’t have a strong opinion, are provided with disinformation that influences them to vote for a certain political party. In this process, they use religion, violence and many other aspects for provocation,” added Sumon, also founding editor of fact-checking organisation FactWatch.
In one-month from mid-December 2025 to mid-January 2026, The Daily Star documented 220 cases of disinformation circulated by various party-aligned actors.
Entities that appear to support Jamaat-i-Islami top the list, with half of the documented instances of disinformation (96) coming from them within this limited dataset. The Awami League-aligned groups follow with 78, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)-aligned actors 38.
Together, these 220 posts received over 2 million engagements (likes, comments, and shares) within the first 24 hours after they were published, showing how fast such content can reach voters.
Jamaat-aligned entities dominate the engagement share, accounting for more than 1.8 million interactions (90.68 per cent). The AL and the BNP-aligned actors trail far behind with 5.13pc and 3.57pc of the total engagement, respectively.
Targeting rivals
Data show that disinformation in the election season is not random noise but a deliberate tactic aimed at political rivals.
Findings show the Jamaat‑aligned entities directed four of every five (78pc) pieces of disinformation at the BNP, once an ally but now the main political rival. These posts aggressively framed BNP and its leadership as extortionists and criminals, attempting to position Jamaat as the morally superior alternative.
For example, Uttorbongo Television, which released an AI video featuring a staged interview with an elephant handler who falsely claimed the BNP was the “real extortionist.”
BNP‑aligned actors countered in equal measures, targeting Jamaat with 80pc of their disinformation campaign.
These contents frequently questioned Jamaat’s Islamic credentials and portrayed the party as a threat to the Hindus.
Meanwhile, pro‑Awami League entities mostly targeted the interim government and student coordinators. Examples include a widely shared claim that Chief Adviser Dr Muhammad Yunus was plotting a civil war.
Across the political divides, defamation was the dominant weapon. Of the 220 pieces of documented disinformation, 155 were categorised as defamatory. Nearly 90pc of all defamatory content spread by Jamaat-aligned entities targeted the BNP, while almost all defamatory content from BNP-aligned actors focused on Jamaat.
Both sides accused each other of criminality.
On December 21, 2025, a high‑engagement post falsely alleged that BNP Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir and his brother ran a multimillion‑taka scheme to smuggle Awami League leaders across the border. But there was no evidence provided against the claim.
Jamaat‑aligned actors also promoted conspiracy narratives, saying the BNP is willing to compromise national interests for Indian favour, including a fabricated story that Tarique Rahman had agreed not to purchase weapons without India’s permission.
BNP‑aligned pages attacked with their own “moral‑corruption” narratives, including a fabricated post accusing Chhatra Shibir activists of partying and drinking after inciting nationwide unrest over Osman Hadi’s killing.
Pro‑Awami League actors, meanwhile, focused on undermining student coordinators, Jamaat, and the interim government. One post falsely claimed that student coordinators attended a DJ party after Osman Hadi’s funeral.
Tactics employed
Nearly 59pc of the analysed posts were manipulative content, which twisted truth into a false narrative.
For example, on January 5, 2026, BNP‑aligned political analyst Maruf Mallick made one such post, distorting the findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances. Although the official report stated that most individuals still missing were from the BNP, Maruf reframed this to allege a “secret understanding” between the Awami League and Jamaat‑Shibir, claiming detainees linked to Jamaat had been quietly released.
This pattern was widespread. Of the 62 manipulative posts pushed by Jamaat-aligned entities, 48 targeted the BNP, while pro‑BNP actors produced 18 such posts, almost all aimed at Jamaat.
Beyond outright fabrication, political actors also distorted facts by presenting information out of context. Unlike fabrication, which relies on complete falsehoods, decontextualisation manipulates authentic information to construct a misleading narrative.
Among the content analysed, 27 posts fell into this category, where real statements or events were reframed to serve partisan agendas. For example, one video post claimed to show a scene where a BNP leader harassed a freedom fighter. However, the video appears to show someone asking another person to change his seat.
Entities that appear to support the Awami League mostly pushed narratives of minority persecution, exaggerating isolated incidents into claims of widespread violence, and invoking calls for foreign intervention.
Medium used
While videos remain the dominant vehicle for disinformation, recent patterns show the growing popularity of photocards. Of the 220 disinformation items analysed, 104 were videos and 44 photocards.
Roughly one‑third of the disinformation posts relied on forged documents or fabricated quotes, with 75 such instances identified. These were split evenly between pro‑Jamaat and pro‑Awami League pages and users.
Deepfakes and other AI‑generated content formed the second most common category, totalling 58 documented cases.
Pro‑Jamaat entities produced the highest number in this category with 27 instances, followed by pro‑BNP actors with 17, and pro‑Awami League entities with 14.
Methodology
The 220 posts analysed were collected by monitoring a watchlist of 615 Facebook pages and profiles known for spreading disinformation and hate speech. The watchlist was compiled through a rigorous, political party-blind selection process involving manual monitoring, targeted keyword searches, and cross-referencing with independent fact-checking resources.
Political alignment was assessed by manually reviewing the most recent 30 posts of each actor before data collection began in mid-December. No official party links were examined.
In the watchlist, 27.4pc appeared AL-aligned, 25.57pc Jamaat-aligned and 14.5 BNP-aligned. The others included National Citizen Party, meme pages, unaffiliated content creators and other foreign entities.
This article was originally published on The Daily Star, an ANN partner of Dawn. Header illustration via The Daily Star.
