O'Donoghue v. United States: Difference between revisions

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The Supreme Court issued an opinion on May 29, 1933. Ordinarily, the [[United States territorial court|territorial court]]s deciding cases in the territories are [[Article IV tribunal]]s and strictly limited to their statutes for their authority to do so. The Constitution does not extend to a territorial holding of the United States unless and until Congress announces that it does. However, the District of Columbia is distinct from all other territories because it is composed of land that was previously occupied by states. The Supreme Court announced in this decision that, once Congress has extended the Constitution’s reach to an area, Congress cannot withdraw it. Thus, the District of Columbia’s courts cannot be organized under Article IV; they must be organized under Article III, and their judges are entitled to Article III protections including the benefit of the [[Compensation Clause]].<ref name=”case”/> The court dismissed the relevant statement in ”Ex parte Bakelite Corp.” as [[dicta]] that was not [[Ratio decidendi|required for the decision]].<ref name=”CONAN1938″/>

Regarding Congress’s Article IV power to administer territories of the United States, the court observed that the language granting that power referred to “the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” Since the language was not “territory or property,” the court discerned a difference between “the territory” and “a territory” belonging to the United States. The former refers to land controlled by the United States whereas the latter refers to a governmental subdivision which happens to be called a “territory” but may as well be called by another name like [[colony]], [[province]], or [[insular area]].

===Dissent and the Article I argument===

1933 United States Supreme Court case

O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia^[a] and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals are constitutional courts of the United States, ordained and established under Article III.^[1]^[2]

Background

Supreme Court precedent

In Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co. (1923), the Supreme Court held that Congress could give the D.C. courts powers different than those used by other federal courts because of its powers over the District conferred by Article I. At this time, the common understanding was that the D.C. courts were legislative courts.^[3] In Ex parte Bakelite Corp. (1929), the Supreme Court mentioned in passing that the courts in the District of Columbia, a territory, were legislative courts; i.e., Article IV courts rather than Article III courts.^[1]^[2]

Facts

Daniel W. O’Donoghue was an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, having been duly appointed to that position by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. He duly qualified as such justice on February 29, 1932, and had ever since been engaged in the performance of the duties of the office. At the time of his appointment and entry upon his duties, his salary was fixed by act of Congress^[b] at $10,000 per year, which was paid to him until June 30, 1932.^[1]

William Hitz was an associate justice of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, having been appointed on December 5, 1930, by the President and later confirmed by the Senate. On February 13, 1931, he duly qualified as such associate justice, and had ever since been engaged in performing the duties of his office. By the act of Congress already referred to, his salary was fixed at the rate of $12,500 per year, which was paid to him until June 30, 1932.^[1]

By the Legislative Appropriation Act of June 30, 1932,^[c] reduced the salaries of all federal judges whose salaries could be reduced. Because Article III includes the Compensation Clause guaranteeing that a federal judge of an Article III court “shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,” this reduction excluded them. However, it included the federal judges presiding over federal tribunals organized under different articles of the Constitution, including Article I tribunals and Article IV tribunals.^[1]

In July 1932, the Comptroller General of the United States held that the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia were legislative courts and that their judges were not entitled to the protection of the Compensation Clause. Thereupon, the Department of Justice reduced the annual compensation of Justice O’Donoghue by 10 percent, and Justice Hitz by by 20 percent. On January 19, 1933, O’Donoghue and Hitz sued in the United States Court of Claims to recover the amount of the deductions.^[1]

The judges argued that the courts they presided over were Article III courts, and that they were Article III judges entitled to the protection of the Compensation Clause. With regards to any differences between these courts and other federal courts, the judges contended that Congress had never restricted the D.C. courts’ Article III authority and had only acted under other parts of the Constitution (including Article I, Section 8, Clause 17) to enlarge the D.C. courts’ powers beyond those of other federal courts. The plaintiffs said that they were bringing the suit to determine the constitutional status of the courts, not merely to personally enrich themselves.^[1]

The government replied that the justices of the D.C. courts were not Article III judges, and were therefore not protected by the Compensation Clause. Thus, the government asserted that the appropriation act reducing their wages was constitutional.^[1]

Upon this state of the record, the Court of Claims issued two certified questions to the Supreme Court of the United States under the Judiciary Act of 1925:

“Does Section 1, Article III, of the Constitution of the United States apply to the Supreme Court (and to the Court of Appeals) of the District of Columbia and forbid a reduction of the compensation of the Justices thereof during their continuance in office?”^[1]
“Can the compensation of a Justice of the Supreme Court (or of the Court of Appeals) of the District of Columbia be lawfully diminished during his continuance in office?”^[1]

Opinion of the court

The Supreme Court issued an opinion on May 29, 1933. Ordinarily, the territorial courts deciding cases in the territories are Article IV tribunals and strictly limited to their statutes for their authority to do so. The Constitution does not extend to a territorial holding of the United States unless and until Congress announces that it does. However, the District of Columbia is distinct from all other territories because it is composed of land that was previously occupied by states. The Supreme Court announced in this decision that, once Congress has extended the Constitution’s reach to an area, Congress cannot withdraw it. Thus, the District of Columbia’s courts cannot be organized under Article IV; they must be organized under Article III, and their judges are entitled to Article III protections including the benefit of the Compensation Clause.^[1] The court dismissed the relevant statement in Ex parte Bakelite Corp. as dicta that was not required for the decision.^[2]

Dissent and the Article I argument

The dissent co-written by Justices Charles Evans Hughes, Willis Van Devanter, and Benjamin N. Cardozo asserts that the courts at issue are Article I tribunals. Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 authorizes Congress “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States….” To the dissenters, this gave Congress the authority to establish the District of Columbia courts under Article I, meaning the judges in this case were not entitled to the protection of the Compensation Clause.^[1]

Because the majority decided this case under Article III, the grant of power to Congress under Article I coincides with the grant of judicial power to the courts under Article III. That is, Congress may adopt additional legislation regulating the District of Columbia’s courts under Article I, but this legislation cannot affect those court’s judicial power under Article III. Because that Article I power is limited to the District, Congress cannot use it to legislate regarding federal courts elsewhere.^[2] This observation distinguished O’Donoghue from the Keller case.^[3]

Later developments

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William Hitz continued as a justice until his death in 1935.^[4] Daniel W. O’Donoghue also continued as a justice and assumed senior status on October 31, 1946. His service terminated in 1948, due to his death.^[5]

Notes

^ The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia was later renamed the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
^ Chapter 6, 44 Stat. 919.
^ Chapter 314, 47 Stat. 382, 401.

References

External links

Text of O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933) is available from: Justia

This article incorporates written opinion of a United States federal court. As a work of the U.S. federal government, the text is in the public domain.

O’Donoghue v. United States: Difference between revisions