Runyon v. McCrary: Difference between revisions

 

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A federal appeals court reviewed the discrimination case against Fairfax-Brewster and Bobbe’s schools and agreed that the evidence clearly showed both schools had rejected the Gonzales and McCrary children solely because they were not white. The appeals court held firmly that the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is a “limitation upon private discrimination” that applies to private schools.

A federal appeals court reviewed the discrimination case against Fairfax-Brewster and Bobbe’s schools and agreed that the evidence clearly showed both schools had rejected the Gonzales and McCrary children solely because they were not white. The appeals court held firmly that the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is a “limitation upon private discrimination” that applies to private schools.

The court specifically rejected the schools’ constitutional defenses. It found that their discriminatory policies were not shielded by a right to privacy or free association. The judges wrote that when an institution opens its doors to the public through advertising and admissions processes, it forfeits any claim to a “private” selection right that would justify racial exclusion.

The court specifically rejected the schools’ constitutional defenses. It found that their discriminatory policies were not shielded by a right to privacy or free association. The judges wrote that when an institution opens its doors to the public through advertising and admissions processes, it forfeits any claim to a “private” selection right that would justify racial exclusion.

==Questions before the Court==

==Questions before the Court==

1976 United States Supreme Court case

Runyon v. McCrary
Full case name	Runyon, et ux., dba Bobbe’s School v. McCrary, et al.
Citations	427 U.S. 160 (more)
Argument	Oral argument
Federal law prohibits private schools from discriminating on the basis of race.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger Associate Justices William J. Brennan Jr. · Potter Stewart Byron White · Thurgood Marshall Harry Blackmun · Lewis F. Powell Jr. William Rehnquist · John P. Stevens
Majority	Stewart, joined by Burger, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens
Concurrence	Powell
Concurrence	Stevens
Dissent	White, joined by Rehnquist
Civil Rights Act of 1866

Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), was a landmark case by the United States Supreme Court, which ruled that private schools that discriminate on the basis of race or establish racial segregation are in violation of federal law.^[1] Whereas Brown v. Board of Education barred segregation by public schools, this case barred segregation in private schools. This decision is built on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. another landmark civil rights case that affirmed the federal government’s ability to penalize racist acts by private actors.

Dissenting Justices Byron White and William Rehnquist argued that the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (popularly known as the Civil Rights Act of 1866) indicated that the Act was not designed to prohibit private racial discrimination, but only state-sponsored racial discrimination (as had been held in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883).

Two African American students, Michael McCrary and Colin Gonzales, filed suit believing that they were denied admission to private schools in Virginia based on their race. McCrary and Gonzales were denied admission to Bobbe’s School; Gonzales was also denied admission to Fairfax-Brewster School. A class action was filed against the schools by the parents of both students. A federal district court ruled for McCrary and Gonzales, finding that the school’s admission policies were racially discriminatory. The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Russell and Katheryne Runyon d.b.a Bobbe’s School and Fairfax-Brewster School were schools in Northern Virginia. Bobbe’s was founded in 1958 as a segregation academy with five European-American students. By 1972 it had grown to 200, but had never admitted a black child.^[1] Fairfax-Brewster had a similar history from 1955.

Both schools explicitly told the families they did not admit non-white students and rejected the children (Colin Gonzales and Michael McCrary) because of their race. A federal district court found that this racial discrimination violated a federal civil rights law (42 U.S.C. § 1981). As a result, the court:

1. Ordered the schools to stop using race as a factor in admissions.
2. Awarded monetary compensation to the McCrary family and Colin Gonzales.
3. Ordered the schools to pay the families’ attorney’s fees ($1,000 each).

A federal appeals court reviewed the discrimination case against Fairfax-Brewster and Bobbe’s schools and agreed that the evidence clearly showed both schools had rejected the Gonzales and McCrary children solely because they were not white. The appeals court held firmly that the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is a “limitation upon private discrimination” that applies to private schools.

The court specifically rejected the schools’ constitutional defenses. It found that their discriminatory policies were not shielded by a right to privacy or free association. The judges wrote that when an institution opens its doors to the public through advertising and admissions processes, it forfeits any claim to a “private” selection right that would justify racial exclusion. However, it reversed the lower court on one point: it set aside the order for the schools to pay the families’ attorneys’ fees. In all other respects, the ruling against the schools stood.

1. Were the admission policies of the private schools in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981?^[2]
2. Did the Ku Klux Klan Act violate the Constitutional right to privacy and free association?

In a 7–2 decision Justice Stewart wrote the opinion for the Court. The Court determined that the Ku Klux Klan Act prohibited the racially discriminatory policies of the schools. While the schools were private, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. held that the Ku Klux Klan Act applied to “purely private acts of racial discrimination”. Further, Stewart wrote that the school’s admission policies were “classical violation[s] of Section 1981”. The Court acknowledged that parents had the right to send their children to schools that “promote the belief [of] racial segregation”, but that neither parents’ nor students’ freedom of association was violated by the application of 42 U.S.C. §1981.^[3] The Court cited Pierce v. Society of Sisters and the right of the State “reasonably to regulate all schools” to further justify the decision.^[4]

Justice White was concerned about the potential far-reaching impact of holding private racial discrimination illegal, which, if taken to its logical conclusion, might ban many varied forms of voluntary self-segregation, including social and advocacy groups that limited their membership to blacks.^[5]

Runyon‘s holding was severely limited in 1989 by Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,^[6] which narrowly construed Section 1981 as not applying to any discrimination occurring after the making of a contract, such as racial harassment on the job (although the Patterson majority expressly claimed that they were not overruling Runyon). In turn, Patterson was legislatively overruled by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

• Bogdanski, John A. (1977). “Section 1981 and the Thirteenth Amendment after Runyon v. McCrary. On the Doorsteps of Discriminatory Private Clubs”. Stanford Law Review. 29 (4). Stanford Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 4: 747–793. doi:10.2307/1228260. JSTOR 1228260.