The global tide of ‘democratic backsliding’ is forcing scholars and citizens alike to confront uncomfortable truths about the system once hailed as ‘the best.’
As political scholar Joel Day observed, in the May 2025 issue of the Journal of Democracy, that voters sense a need for change but remain profoundly uncertain about what that change should be. This widespread scepticism is not only fuelling dissatisfaction with democratic outcomes but is also casting doubt on the numerous proposals aired to stall or reverse the decline.
The core issue, it seems, lies in a fundamental disconnect between the idealised version of democracy and its lived reality. For decades after World War II, the West thoroughly romanticised democracy as a largely flawless ideology, especially during the Cold War, when it was deified as the ‘champion’ fighting against Soviet communism and authoritarianism.
This sacralisation meant that, while critiques of democracy were common in authoritarian states, established democracies rarely tolerated serious internal critiques. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 was celebrated as democracy’s decisive victory.
However, disastrous economic and political outcomes in former dictatorships that adopted democracy forced a reassessment. Initially attributed to the residues of authoritarian rule, these systemic issues did not simply rot away. Instead, democracy collided with deep-seated political, economic and social monoliths, leading to the creation of ‘hybrid regimes.’
Across the world, romanticised expectations of democracy have collided with social realities, resulting in a pragmatic turn where stability outranks ideals
Countries such as Turkey, Russia, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia and Mexico developed hybrid forms that sometimes produced better economic and political results than the idealised form of democracy.
A convenient, yet increasingly rhetorical way to bemoan the ‘stifling of democracy’ in hybrid systems is to blame an omnipresent ‘establishment’ or ‘ruling elites.’ While these factors certainly play a role, this explanation falls short when considering the paradox of public support for forces deemed illiberal.
Why are more and more people, even in established democracies, okay with happenings that terrify ‘true democrats?’ Consider the American context: a poll by Change Research found 42 percent of Americans support an unconstitutional third term for Donald Trump. Is this a failure of democracy to come to terms with the rapidly mutating global economic landscape?
American political scientist Cas Mudde wrote about the ‘paradox of democracy’: the inherent tension between the democratic principle of popular sovereignty (majority rule) and the liberal principle of protecting individual rights. This conflict raises awkward questions — should illiberal forces that come to power through legitimate democratic means be tolerated? Should constitutional checks exist to limit the rise of such forces? What happens when a majority of voters actively blocks reforms necessary for a country’s economic health?
The response lies not in policy alone, but in psychology. As American political scientists Larry M. Bartels and Christopher H. Achen argued in Democracy for Realists, “Most voters feel more than they think.” If political decisions are based on emotions and cultural dispositions rather than logical institutional propositions, then citizen discontent will not automatically translate into the acceptance of proposed procedural fixes. Social conditions, not just institutional design, are blocking reform.
In Pakistan, for example, social media and newspapers are replete with outcries against the current government and the ‘establishment’ for stifling democracy through contentious constitutional amendments. Yet, the alternatives being suggested by the critics are largely rhetorical.
The question for champions of democracy resisting these reforms must be: were the institutions that these amendments are attempting to reshape successful in evolving democracy in the country?
The answer is a resounding ‘No’.
The current institutional and political elites are proceeding with these amendments in the belief that they will provide political and economic stability by checking factors seen as a source of tensions and chaos. Unlike past experiments, this current constitutional push is not founded upon a grand ideology. If it has one, that ideology is pragmatism.
The crisis in democracy is a crisis of faith in its procedural fixes. When institutions fail to deliver tangible economic and political results for the majority, the stage is set for a pragmatic turn — a willingness to accept outcomes that prioritise stability and efficacy over the strict adherence to an idealised, yet often ineffective, democratic procedure.
Published in Dawn, EOS, November 16th, 2025
