User:Michaelas10/sandbox: Difference between revisions – Wikipedia

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Please note that addressing whether this article has NPOV issues – and putting a tag, if necessary – does not contradict the discussions in the previous RfC, which concerned the central framing and particularly the first sentence. This point was raised by Coining in a recent discussion on this talk page.

• Infobox:
  • The infobox asserts that the genocide started on “7 October 2023”, instead of simply saying “October 2023”, despite noting “This start date is the beginning of the war. Sources disagree on when the genocide started…” (If we know there is a disagreement, why is the infobox taking one side of that disagreement in contravention of WP:NPOV?) At the very least the date should be changed to “October 2023,” although even this assumes that a genocide by Israel began at the same time as Israel’s invasion into Gaza, which isn’t inherently the case based on reliable sources differing as to when the genocide began. That last point is noted for completeness, a change to simply “October 2023” would be fairer than the current text of the article. Coining (talk) 04:08, 9 November 2025 (UTC)
  • One of the infobox’s notes says, “Per the Gaza Health Ministry and Government Information Office, which has previously been deemed reliable by prominent and independent organisations”, even though a neutral approach would recognize that some reliable sources deem the ministry reliable and some do not. Coining (talk) 04:08, 9 November 2025 (UTC)
  • The deaths and injured statistics in the infobox previously conveyed that these amounts were unknown before citing specific numbers, but this uncertainty has been removed, so that it is now presented as fact that all of these deaths/injuries are part of the Gaza genocide. Even assuming that the statistics are accurate (and any concerns on those fronts can be raised in the “Genocidal acts” sections below), it’s still the case that included in these numbers are deaths and injuries either (a) not caused by Israel — e.g. caused by Hamas or other militants, such as Hamas executions of opponents, or the errant rocket aimed at Israel, but that landed in a hospital car park, a set of deaths/injuries that was erroneously blamed on Israel, or (b) deaths of combatants, including Hamas fighters. Editors have argued that even deaths of Hamas members are not excluded from the potential case for genocide, but by the same token, neither are they automatically included. By presenting all-inclusive death/injury numbers in the infobox, none of these points are fairly presented. A range could be presented, or perhaps say “Unknown amount; up to _____”). Phrases like “at least,” though perhaps appropriate if this were the infobox for Gaza war are not appropriate here, given that it should not be assumed that the Gaza war and Gaza genocide are identical in scope. The current approach takes sides in violation of WP:NPOV not just on the question of whether there is/was a genocide, but on the unsettled question of to what extent non-civilian and non-Israel caused deaths should be included in the genocide. Coining (talk) 04:08, 9 November 2025 (UTC)
  • See also the critique below under “indirect deaths” of the 186,000 figure cited in the infobox. The separate listing (as of 12 November 2025) of 10,000 famine deaths is presumably a subset of the 186,000, and yet it is listed here as if it is an additional set of deaths. Coining (talk) 02:52, 12 November 2025 (UTC)
• Background section: While this section does cite useful information from UN and NGO sources, the central issue with it concerns selective omission of information that does not conform to the historical narrative it creates:
  • It does not mention the 2005 disengagement at all, instead choosing to start with Hamas’ takeover. I would argue the 2005 disengagement is crucial for context, as the article’s subsequent framing that Israel’s Gaza policy has been suggested to be driven by territorial expansion (including the ‘Greater Israel’ mention in the same section) is contested in light of the 2005 evacuation. Conversely, critics argue that continued external control (borders, airspace, maritime access, population registry) kept effective power in Israeli hands. In any case, disengagement is the hinge for that debate.
  • It fails to mention intervening warfare between Israel and Hamas (2008, 2012, 2014, and 2021), including rocket attacks on Israel. Halting the rocket attacks – which were also ongoing throughout October 2023, after October 7th – has been cited by Israel as a central motivation for the invasion of Gaza, as did achieving control of the Philadelphi Corridor to stop arms smuggling. Both motivations should be mentioned.
  • It mentions Israel’s role but neglects Egypt’s role in the blockade. This fact undermines the narrative that Israel is solely responsible for Gaza’s pre-war situation, and Hamas’ stated justification to attack Israel in particular.
  • It fails to describe Hamas’ legal designation and ideology. It does not mention that Hamas is designated a terrorist organization by the US and EU, which is standard factual context in other Wikipedia articles (including Background to the Gaza war and October 7 attacks). It also omits the group’s ideological documents (1988 charter; 2017 policy document) that shape how many states and analysts interpret Hamas’ goals. While I don’t see a problem with writing Hamas’ stated justifications for the attack, credible analysts have also explicitly tied the assault to Hamas’s long-standing aim of eliminating Israel. Moreover, even some senior Hamas officials voiced the elimination aim outright:
    • Hamas’s 1988 Covenant calls for the eradication of Israel; the 2017 “Document of General Principles and Policies” softened rhetoric and allowed a state on 1967 lines but still rejected Israel’s legitimacy and affirmed “full and complete liberation … from the river to the sea.” See here.
    • CSIS (Daniel Byman) argues the assault flowed from Hamas’s enduring ideology, not a departure from it.
    • The Washington Institute notes Hamas “invested in … militant infrastructure” to someday launch an attack that, in its view, could “contribute to the destruction of Israel.”
    • On Oct. 24, senior Hamas official Ghazi Hamad said on Lebanon’s LBC that Hamas would “repeat the October 7 [attacks] again and again…until Israel is annihilated,” adding “Israel is a country that has no place on our land.” (LBC report; MEMRI translation of the original Arabic broadcast).
• Genocidal intent and incitement: The section mostly curates sources that affirm genocidal intent, but omits contemporaneous denials and explanations by those accused, mainstream legal views that contest inferences of genocidal specific intent (the crux of the crime), and contradictory rhetoric by the IDF:
  • Missing the accused officials’ denials/clarifications about their own words. Most significantly:
    • Herzog: After his Oct. 12, 2023 presser was cited by courts and inquiries, he publicly said the ICJ misrepresented him and that, in the same briefing, he condemned harm to innocents and pledged compliance with the law of war. That contextual denial is not summarized.
    • Netanyahu/“Amalek”: The section cites Amalek as evidence of intent but omits the Prime Minister’s Office’s response that invoking “Remember what Amalek did to you” was a historical/rhetorical reference to Hamas’s deeds, not a call to annihilate Palestinians, and that the phrase appears in memorial contexts. This official clarification should be included next to the allegation.
  • Not acknowledging mainstream legal debate on specific intent & incitement thresholds. The section quotes bodies, including the UN CoI and Amnesty International, saying intent is the “only reasonable inference,” but readers aren’t told that some serious international law scholars caution that proving genocidal specific intent is exceptionally demanding, and concluded that the evidence in this case does not meet that high bar:
    • Keitner (UC Hastings) – Lawfare. Summarizing the record at the ICJ stage, she notes that “several observers” find South Africa did not sufficiently connect inflammatory statements to the actions of actual wartime decision-makers—undercutting the incitement allegation at the state level.
    • Cohen & Shany (Hebrew Univ./IDI). They argue the key statements relied on for incitement are (1) often by actors outside the chain of command, (2) read without balancing clarifications and official policy, and (3) therefore weak evidence of direct and public incitement by those actually directing operations. They note Netanyahu’s “Amalek” line was coupled in the same speech with calls to spare civilians and evacuate them, and that Gallant later stated “we are not fighting the Palestinian people”.
    • Olivia Flasch (EJIL:Talk!), Swedish international lawyer – argues many oft-cited quotes are misread or de-contextualized
  • Not juxtaposing allegations of intent with operational claims of civilian‑harm mitigation. You can argue these measures are neither effective nor sufficient, but the existence of official measures and messaging (evacuation warnings, corridors, some humanitarian coordination; “war is against Hamas, not civilians”) is well-attested. For example, after the three hostages were shot, the IDF chief publicly travelled to Gaza to clarify rules of engagement. There are also the IDF’s own proclamations (e.g. here and here). Right now, those denials/measures are absent in this section, giving the reader the false impression that all rhetoric has been genocidal.

• Genocidal acts, direct killings: The subsection strings together casualty totals and harrowing allegations which are based on reliable sources, but several crucial facts and responses are missing:
  • Without context, it implies that the sheer number of civilians killed in a war, by itself, evidences genocide. But in law, killing members of a group is only genocidal if done with the specific intent to destroy the group as such. Numbers alone never establish that intent. See the UN’s official definition and explanation that intent is the most difficult element to prove.
    • Here, a reference can be made to the previous section on ‘Intent’, where evidence is provided of an explicit intent. But as per the caveats above, this evidence is not incontrovertible. On the other hand, when intent is implicitly inferred from conduct, the ICJ standard is that it must be “the only inference that could reasonably be drawn” from the pattern (the Court’s benchmark in the Bosnia and Croatia genocide cases). This frames casualty data as context, not dispositive proof.
    • Could therefore add a caveat like this: “Under Article II of the Genocide Convention, killing members of the group constitutes a genocidal act only where it is carried out with specific intent to destroy the protected group as such; large‑scale civilian deaths in armed conflict, while potentially evidencing war crimes or crimes against humanity, do not by themselves establish genocidal intent. These casualty figures therefore constitute evidence for genocide only if they are the outcome of genocidal intent (“Intent” section), which is currently being deliberated by the International Court of Justice in South Africa v. Israel.”
  • Attribution without counter‑attribution (one‑sided presentation of disputed allegations): this section lists grave allegations as statements of fact or near‑fact, but often omits the official responses, denials, or investigations that reliable sources also report. For neutrality, both who made the statement and any significant responses to the statement (also with attribution) should be mentioned. A few specific instances:
    • “In April 2024, mass graves were found containing corpses with their hands tied, including women and the elderly.” This is presumably referring to the Nasser Hospital mass graves, and the allegation was made by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (should facts should be clearly stated). On the other hand, open source intelligence by GeoConfirmed (reported here) has argued that the exhumations took place at the same location as the earlier mass burials conducted by Palestinians, a claim that was directly echoed by the IDF: “troops examined corpses that had been buried by Palestinians on the medical center’s grounds, as part of an effort to locate hostages.”
    • “Doctors have identified numerous Palestinian children with single gunshot wounds to the head and chest, consistent with intentional targeting by Israeli forces.” This was also disputed. First, IDF directly denied it, stating that “the claim that the IDF deliberately targets civilians, including children, is entirely unfounded.” Second, West Point’s John Spencer (Modern War Institute) wrote that the presence of 5.56mm rounds and head/chest wounds does not by itself establish who fired or intent, noting Hamas also uses the same caliber weapons.
    • “In March 2024, Haaretz reported that some Israeli commanders had set up “kill zones” in which soldiers were commanded to kill anyone on sight, even if they were unarmed.” The IDF has also directly denied this. Moreover, other critical reporting doesn’t support “anyone”. Even Reuters’ coverage of the Breaking the Silence testimonies about a border-area “kill zone” portrays targeting patterns (e.g., “adult males” shot; “warning shots” for women/children) – problematic in their own right – but not a blanket policy to kill anyone in those areas. That undercuts the most extreme gloss sometimes put on the Haaretz piece, which the article currently presents.
  • Missing a crucial counter-claim by Israel: that Hamas and PIJ intentionally operate around and under civilian infrastructure (urban entrenchment), for example by building tunnels under residential neighbourhoods, thereby contributing to the large number of direct deaths via collateral. In support of this, John Spenser has cited the Battle of Mosul in which ISIL has displayed similar urban entrenchment resulting in around 10,000 civillians being killed. Barry R. Rosen (MIT) has also cited Raqqa.

• Genocidal acts, indirect deaths:

The main source for indirect deaths is a projection (“…or would occur in the coming months and years”). It shouldn’t be the case that such a calculation is independent on whether the Gaza war continued or ended. The advent of a ceasefire (that might become permanent, but at the very least has slowed down depravation in the Gaza Strip) in mid-October 2025 should be relevant to Wikipedia’s inclusion of this study. It would seem odd for a projection of deaths to be independent of the end of active combat. Nowhere does this section grapple with this point, or caveat the conclusions of the report, instead it presents it uncritically. This is a violation of WP:NPOV in that it improperly relies on a prediction of the future at the time made, violating WP:CRYSTAL, without any attempt to recognize that circumstances have changed. Coining (talk) 02:37, 12 November 2025 (UTC)

• Genocidal acts, starvation and blockade:

• Genocidal acts, deliberate destruction of civilian infrastructure:

• Genocidal acts, forced displacement:

• Genocidal acts, attacks on healthcare and preventing births: omits information about vaccination campaign, cases of facilitating healthcare. Omits claims of militant use of healthcare facilities, including a few relatively clear cases.

• Genocidal acts, destruction of cultural, religious and educational sites:

• Genocidal acts, serious bodily and mental harm, and sexual violence:

• Academic and legal discourse:

• Responsibility of third states and other entities:

• Denial: The entire section should be removed (and the see also link restored, effectively reversing these two edits on 10 November, as it is an effort to frame as WP:FRINGE the minority viewpoint regarding a genocide. More broadly, it is deceptive/confusing to readers who may naturally assume that a Denial section is about Israel’s perspective (and that of others outside Israel who agree), but are instead presented a section that seeks to simply reiterate the perspective of how wrong Israel is.

• General issues not limited to any one section
  • The numerous references to Al Jazeera in the article seem to run afoul of WP:ALJAZEERA, which says Most editors seem to agree that Al Jazeera English and especially Al Jazeera Arabic are biased sources on the Arab–Israeli conflict and on topics for which the Qatari government has a conflict of interest.. This is both a WP:RS concern and a WP:NPOV concern. Coining (talk) 16:47, 8 November 2025 (UTC)
    • Some editors have cited WP:BIASED in support of the notion that it is ok to include biased sources, as they may be the best source of information. However, there are numerous sources that have been rejected for inclusion in the article on the basis that they are biased in support of Israel’s position. The article should have a consistent approach.