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Formally, R&AW does not have a [[Statute|written statue]], rather, it is a creation of [[Executive order|executive order]], which has allowed the agency to operate without answerability to [[Parliament of India|Parliament]].<ref name=”Law_1″>{{Cite web|url=https://lawschoolpolicyreview.com/2020/05/14/the-legitimacy-of-indian-intelligence-agencies/|title=The Legitimacy of Indian Intelligence Agencies|website=lawschoolpolicyreview.com|date=14 May 2020}}</ref> This nature is also shared by the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which is also has its origin in executive order, and thus also lacks a written statute.<ref name=”Law_1″/> Technically, it means both agencies exist and function without legal legitimacy or parliamentary authorization.<ref name=”Accountability_2″>{{Cite web|url=https://www.outlookindia.com/national/making-intelligence-agencies-accountable-news-263866|title=Making Intelligence Agencies Accountable|website=www.outlookindia.com|date=17 January 2024}}</ref> |
Formally, R&AW does not have a [[Statute|written statue]], rather, it is a creation of [[Executive order|executive order]], which has allowed the agency to operate without answerability to [[Parliament of India|Parliament]].<ref name=”Law_1″>{{Cite web|url=https://lawschoolpolicyreview.com/2020/05/14/the-legitimacy-of-indian-intelligence-agencies/|title=The Legitimacy of Indian Intelligence Agencies|website=lawschoolpolicyreview.com|date=14 May 2020}}</ref> This nature is also shared by the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which is also has its origin in executive order, and thus also lacks a written statute.<ref name=”Law_1″/> Technically, it means both agencies exist and function without legal legitimacy or parliamentary authorization.<ref name=”Accountability_2″>{{Cite web|url=https://www.outlookindia.com/national/making-intelligence-agencies-accountable-news-263866|title=Making Intelligence Agencies Accountable|website=www.outlookindia.com|date=17 January 2024}}</ref> |
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Calls for accountability for India’s intelligence apparatus were made in the aftermath of the [[The Emergency|The Emergency]] of 1975-77, when institutional abuses under the then-[[Third Indira Gandhi ministry|Indira Gandhi government]] were widespread.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.epw.in/journal/2014/25/web-exclusives/national-security-whom.html|title |
Calls for accountability for India’s intelligence apparatus were made in the aftermath of the [[The Emergency|The Emergency]] of 1975-77, when institutional abuses under the then-[[Third Indira Gandhi ministry|Indira Gandhi government]] were widespread.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.epw.in/journal/2014/25/web-exclusives/national-security-whom.html|title=”National Security” for whom?|website=www.epw.in|date=21 June 2014}}</ref> In 1978, then-prime minister [[Morarji Desai]] appointed a committee headed by former [[Home Secretary (India)|Home Secretary]] [[Lallan Prasad Singh|L. P. Singh]] to investigate the functioning and misuse of the [[Central Bureau of Investigation]] (CBI) and the IB for political ends; it subsequently recommended the creation of “a comprehensive central legislation to remove the deficiency of not having a central investigative agency with a self-sufficient statutory charter of duties and functions”.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.deccanherald.com/india/needed-eagle-not-parrot-2259740|title=Needed an eagle, not a parrot|website=www.deccanherald.com|date=11 May 2013}}</ref> |
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Nevertheless, there have been some arguments in support of no oversight; one of them is that a foreign intelligence agency does not operate within a permissible area; while they may be working in the interests of one’s own country, they are certainly not operating in the interest of the host country, and are thus not liable to legal accountability.<ref name=”ORF_2″>{{Cite web|url=https://www.orfonline.org/research/legally-empowering-indias-intelligence-and-enforcement-structures|title=Legally empowering India’s intelligence and enforcement structures|website=www.orfonline.org|date=9 December 2009}}</ref> Another argument in favor is that in multi-party systems or coalition politics, the efficient functioning of the agency may be hindered due to political interference, thus necessitating a nature of function independent from oversight.<ref name=”ORF_2″/> |
Nevertheless, there have been some arguments in support of no oversight; one of them is that a foreign intelligence agency does not operate within a permissible area; while they may be working in the interests of one’s own country, they are certainly not operating in the interest of the host country, and are thus not liable to legal accountability.<ref name=”ORF_2″>{{Cite web|url=https://www.orfonline.org/research/legally-empowering-indias-intelligence-and-enforcement-structures|title=Legally empowering India’s intelligence and enforcement structures|website=www.orfonline.org|date=9 December 2009}}</ref> Another argument in favor is that in multi-party systems or coalition politics, the efficient functioning of the agency may be hindered due to political interference, thus necessitating a nature of function independent from oversight.<ref name=”ORF_2″/> |
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Revision as of 08:28, 25 October 2025
Administration
Oversight
Formally, R&AW does not have a written statue, rather, it is a creation of executive order, which has allowed the agency to operate without answerability to Parliament.[1] This nature is also shared by the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which is also has its origin in executive order, and thus also lacks a written statute.[1] Technically, it means both agencies exist and function without legal legitimacy or parliamentary authorization.[2]
Calls for accountability for India’s intelligence apparatus were made in the aftermath of the The Emergency of 1975-77, when institutional abuses under the then-Indira Gandhi government were widespread.[3] In 1978, then-prime minister Morarji Desai appointed a committee headed by former Home Secretary L. P. Singh to investigate the functioning and misuse of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the IB for political ends; it subsequently recommended the creation of “a comprehensive central legislation to remove the deficiency of not having a central investigative agency with a self-sufficient statutory charter of duties and functions”.[4]
Nevertheless, there have been some arguments in support of no oversight; one of them is that a foreign intelligence agency does not operate within a permissible area; while they may be working in the interests of one’s own country, they are certainly not operating in the interest of the host country, and are thus not liable to legal accountability.[5] Another argument in favor is that in multi-party systems or coalition politics, the efficient functioning of the agency may be hindered due to political interference, thus necessitating a nature of function independent from oversight.[5]
However, arguments in support of R&AW and other intelligence agencies necessitating proper oversight have also been made. In 2010, Hamid Ansari, the then-vice president of India highlighted the need for R&AW to have accountability under parliamentary oversight to prevent any potential misuse of power.[6]
Scrutiny
Since its inception in 1968, R&AW has maintained a rigorously secretive existence, with little information avaliable about it in the public domain about its operational activities.[7]
Provisionally, the vast majority of India’s intelligence apparatus – including R&AW, are listed in the Second Schedule of the Right to Information Act, 2005, which in conjunction of Section 24 of the said Act, is exempted from the public disclosure of sensitive information, unless the information that is requested pertains to allegations of corruption and human rights violations.[8] However, such information related to such allegations ma also be witheld, if it is found to in contravention against the Section 8 of the Act, which specifies “information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the State”.[9]
